

Application of Functional Safety in All-Electric Control Systems

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
Introduction

Current market situation


- Most severe downturn in decades
- Slow recovery; prices as before 2015 will not be reached in the near future

OG21 recommendations to cut costs and enhance recovery

- Standardization
- Simplification
- All-electric technology




Source: boerse-online.de.



Source: *The Digital Oil Field*. Oil & Gas Investor.

Fail-Safe Concepts for All-Electric Systems


Mechanical Spring and Clutch



5-in actuator.



All-electric tree with spring-return actuators.




Mechanical spring and clutch

- Trees
- Subsea separation
- Greenfield
- When enough power is available
- Wherever batteries are not acceptable

Well known

Battery concept

- Trees
- Electric HIPPS
- Pump modules
- Greenfields and tie-backs with limited power



New to industry

Joint Industry Project



WITTENSTEIN



Challenges

Technical:

- Safety and availability
- Novel architecture of fail-safe system
- Design life of energy storage

Non-Technical:

- Step change approach
- No AE standards available
- System target costs




Elisha Graves Otis demonstrates his first elevator in the Crystal Palace, New York Exhibition
Source: Wikipedia

Approach: Application of Functional Safety



Any **random, systematic, and common-cause failure** will not lead to a failure of the safety system, which could result in

- loss of asset or facility
- pollution
- injury or death.

SIL	<i>Risk Reduction</i>	Allowed Probability of Event
1	>10	Once in 10 years
2	>100	Once in 100 years
3	>1,000	Once in 1,000 years
4	>10,000	Once in 10,000 years



System Architecture with redundancy (HFT) for Availability and Safety



HFT for Availability
 HFT for Safety



System Architectural Design Trades

Configuration

central

integrated in actuator

Layout / RBD



Safety (PFD)

SIL 2 (1/500)

SIL 2 (1/500)

Relative Downtime

70 %

100%

Cost


70..90 % (depending on number of actuators)

100%

Probability of Failure on Demand

Lower PFD by development and introduction of enhanced diagnosis:

- Cross Checks
- Sweep Test
- Partial Stroke Test
- ...



➔ Immediate detection of failures without additional components!

Systematic Capability: Hardware Fault Tolerance

SFF	Hardware Fault Tolerance					
	0		1		2	
	Complex	Simple	Complex	Simple	Complex	Simple
<60%	Not allowed	SIL 1	SIL 1	SIL 2	SIL 2	SIL 3
≥60%	SIL 1	SIL 2	SIL 2	SIL 3	SIL 3	SIL 4
≥90%	SIL 2	SIL 3	SIL 3	SIL 4	SIL 4	SIL 4
≥99%	SIL 3	SIL 3	SIL 4	SIL 4	SIL 4	SIL 4



Due to high SFF (Diagnosis) the Systematic Capability is SIL 2 or SIL 3

Improved HFT (and PFD) by SMART redundancies


System Architecture: Battery

Battery Data	
$\lambda_{DU}[10e-6]$	0.98
$\lambda_{DD}[10E-6]$	8.82
$\lambda_{SU}[10E-6]$	0
$\lambda_{SD}[10E-6]$	0
SFF [%]	90%
T_1 [h]	720 h
MTTR[h]	1 h

Single Battery



Dual Battery




Comparison

	Single Battery	Dual Battery
HFT	0	1
Type	Complex	Complex
SC	SIL 2	SIL 3
PFD	3.63E-04	3.64E-05
Av	99,67180%	99,99892%
Statistical Downtime	28.75 h/year	57 min/year
Volume	100%	130%

All-Electric Actuation System Summary

- SIL 2 (risk reduction of 100) with continued production at single fault
- System diagnostic coverage >90%
- Valve diagnostic coverage increases to >90%
- High SFF and Safety
- High Availability



Thank you.

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